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Abstract 
 
In this paper we analyse how fairness considerations, in particular considerations of just 
income distribution, affect whether or not people find tax evasion justifiable and their 
willingness to evade taxes. Using data from the Norwegian “Hidden Labour Market 
Survey” we show that individuals with low hourly wages and long working hours have a 
higher probability of justifying tax evasion. These are individuals that arguably are treated 
unfairly in a tax system that taxes an individual’s total income without taking into account 
how many hours the individual has worked. The same individuals are also more willing 
and likely to take home income without reporting it to the tax authorities. The results are 
consistent with a model in which individuals make a trade-off between economic gains 
and fairness considerations when they make decisions about tax evasion. Taken together 
our results suggest that considerations of fair income distribution are important for the 
analysis of tax evasion. 
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1. Introduction 
Most people feel the need to be able to justify their actions to themselves and to others. 
This is also the case when they decide whether or not to abide by a particular law. It is 
easier to violate a law that one believes is unfair than a law that one believes is fair. In this 
paper we analyse how fairness considerations affect whether or not people believe tax 
evasion can be justified and their willingness to engage in tax evasion. The idea that tax 
evasion may be affected by what the taxpayers perceive to be unfair taxation is not new. 
For example, Bordignon (1993) presents a theoretical framework where taxpayers are 
more inclined to evade taxes if they have to pay a tax rate that is higher than what they 
think is a fair price for the public goods they receive. Fairness effects in tax evasion are 
also demonstrated in several experimental studies, such as Fortin, Lacroix and Villeval 
(2004) and Spicer and Becker (1980). In the present paper we focus on how 
considerations of a fair income distribution might affect people’s propensity to justify tax 
evasion and thus how likely they are to evade taxes.  
It is natural to meet attempts to justify tax evasion by appealing to fairness 
considerations with scepticism and ask whether it is just a way to rationalize behaviour 
determined by other types of considerations, such as the expected net economic gain from 
tax evasion. One way to investigate whether fairness considerations play an independent 
role in motivating tax evasion is to identify a group of individuals that is seems reasonable 
to view as unfairly treated by the tax system and then study whether these individuals are 
more likely to view tax evasion as justifiable and more willing to evade taxes. 
The obvious problem with such an approach is the inherent difficulty in 
identifying a group of tax payers that it seems reasonable to view as unfairly treated. 
However, we shall argue that it is possible to identify a particular group of tax payers that 
most people will agree is treated unfairly by a progressive tax system. This is the group of 
individuals who have low hourly wages and work long hours. Evidence from both surveys 
and from economic experiments have documented that most people find inequalities 
reflecting differences in work effort as fair (see for example Cappelen et al 2010, 
Schokkart and Devooght 2003). A progressive tax that is levied on the basis of total 
income reduces inequalities due to differences in work effort and it can therefore be seen 
as unfairly treating those who work long hours. 
In the empirical parts of this paper we show that among individuals with identical 
monthly wages, an individual with low wages and long working hours is more likely to 
justify tax evasion than an individual with high wages and shorter working hours. We also 
show that the individual with low wages and long working hours is more willing to take 
home income without reporting it to the tax authorities. These results are consistent with 
our theoretical model. The results also turn out to be robust to the inclusion of measures 
of human capital, measures of marginal tax and to the inclusion of norms related to tax 
evasion as well as the expected probability of being caught.   
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we present a model in 
which individuals make a trade-off between economic gains and fairness considerations 
when they make decisions about tax evasion. We furthermore argue that individuals with 
low hourly wages and long working hours are unfairly treated in a tax system that does not 
take account of hours worked when taxes are calculated. In section 3 we use data from the 
“Hidden Labour Market Survey” in Norway to analyse empirically the relationship 
between fairness considerations and working hours. In the final section we conclude. 
 
2. Justification and willingness to evade tax 
It is evident from surveys (Gaertner and Schwettmann 2007, Schokkaert and Devooght 
2003) and economic experiments (Camerer 2003) that people are willing to sacrifice 
pecuniary gains in order to avoid large deviations from what they consider to be fair. Such 
experiments have also shown that people care about whether or not income inequality is a 
result of factors under or outside individual control (Konow 2000, Cappelen, Hole, 
Sørensen and Tungodden 2007).  
 When people decide whether or not they shall evade taxes, it is reasonable to 
assume that both economic and fairness considerations play a role. Consequently, a 
person may not be willing to evade taxes even if it would give a net economic gain 
because he finds it difficult to justify such behaviour. Similarly, a person may be willing to 
evade although he does not find it justifiable because the economic gain is high. To study 
the relationship between the ability to justify tax evasion and the willingness to evade 
taxes, we introduce fairness considerations into a model of economically optimal tax 
evasion of the types used in the seminal papers by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and 
Sandmo (1981).  
To focus on the problem of designing a fair tax system, we assume that the only 
purpose of the tax system is to redistribute income. There is in other words no public 
good that needs to be financed. We assume that there is a constant tax rate t  and 
everyone receives a uniform transfer   /B tY n , where Y is the total income in the 
economy and n is the number of individuals in the economy.  
An individual decides how many hours l he will work for an hourly wage rate w. 
His total income wl is taxed at a rate t, and he also receives the transfer B. Let u be the 
income he chooses not to report to the tax authorities, i.e. he reports only wl u . We use 
the standard assumption that the probability of being detected is a decreasing, convex 
function of the reported income, i.e.  p p wl u  , where ' 0p  and '' 0p  1 . An 
alternative is that the probability of detection depends on the evaded amount u only. 
However, it seems reasonable that hiding a certain amount is less suspicious the higher the 
                                                 
1 We do not analyse the game between evaders and tax authorities, such as Reingaum and Wilde (1985 and 
1986) and Erard and Feinstein (1994), but simply assume that the taxpayers expect the probability of 
detection to be a decreasing function of his reported income.  
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reported income is. 2 The penalty tax  (u) is an increasing and convex function of the 
unreported income u, and always exceeds the evaded tax.3 The expected penalty is then
  ( ) ( , )p wl u u u wl   . It follows from the assumptions about (.)p and τ(.) that
1 0  , 11 0  ,      and 22 0  . The expected net income of an individual with 
unreported income u is  
 
( , ) (1 ) ( ; )y u wl t wl B tu u wl       (1) 
 
We assume that the decision to evade is made regularly, and that the evasion is relatively 
small, such that the potential penalty is small relative to the lifetime income. This allows us 
to analyse the tax evasion decision as if the individual is risk neutral, and therefore only 
cares about the expected net income, not the degree of uncertainty. In this respect we 
depart from the Allingham-Sandmo models.  
 We assume that individuals are motivated by a desire for income and leisure and 
by a desire to act in accordance with what they consider to be fair.  For our purpose, we 
lose no insight by using a utility function that is additively separable in a “selfish” and a 
“moral” part, instead of a more general formulation. In this section, the “selfish” part is 
simply the expected income minus the cost of work effort. An individual chooses l and u 
so as to maximize the following utility function.4 
 
*( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( )V u l y u wl zc l f ut e         (2) 
 
The first term is the expected income and is given by equation (1). The second term, 
( )zc l , is the cost of working l hours. The parameter   is a measure of the relative 
preferences for consumption versus leisure. The term (.)f  is what we will call the fairness 
effect on evasion: It captures the individuals’ disutility or moral cost of deviating from what 
he considers to be the justifiable evasion, i.e. the evasion that would give the individual a fair 
income. The term 
*ut e d  is the difference between the actual evasion ut  and the 
justifiable evasion   . The disutility is assumed to be increasing in d if the fraction evaded 
is below the fair fraction, and decreasing in d if the fraction evaded is above the fair 
                                                 
2 In the theoretical literature on tax evasion, the assumptions differ about what factors that determines the 
probability of detection. For example, the probability of detection depends on reported income in 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and in Kleven et al (2012), while it depends on evaded income in Yitzhaki 
(1987). 
 
3 The distinction between penalizing evaded income and evaded tax does not matter for our problem as 
long as we do not discuss changes in the tax rate. 
 
4 In this section, we can leave out subscript i for individual without causing misunderstanding. 
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fraction. Hence, '( ) 0f d  if *ut e and '( ) 0f d  if *ut e . Moreover, ''( ) 0f d  is 
assumed. The weight a person attaches to fairness considerations relative to his narrow 
self-interest is given by β.  
 
2.1. Fair Tax Evasion 
The crucial question is how the justifiable tax evasion,   , is determined. We shall argue 
that    is increasing in l for a given income wl and strictly decreasing in w.  It is evident 
from the political debate, surveys (Gaertner and Schwettmann 2007, Schokkart and 
Devooght 2003), economic experiments (Almås et al 2010, Cappelen et al 2007, Cappelen 
et al 2010, Frohlich and Oppenheimer 2004, and Konow 2000) and contemporary 
theories of justice (Arneson 1989, Cohen 1989, Dworkin 1981, Fleurbaey 1995, Roemer 
1998 and Cappelen and Tungodden 2009) that people view some inequalities as fair and 
others as unfair. For example, a large majority view inequalities arising from differences in 
the number of hours worked as fair, while inequalities arising from gender or race are 
considered as unfair. One view that respects the distinction between fair and unfair 
inequalities is the view that individuals should be rewarded in proportion to their work 
effort. Assuming that person’s i’s work effort is captured by li, his fair income Yi* is then 
given by 
   
wlY
l
l
Y i
j
i
i 

*           (3) 
 
where w is the average hourly wage rate. This principle of income distribution is in line 
with the core idea of liberal egalitarian theories of distributive justice (Dworkin (1981), 
Arneson (1989), Cohen (1989), Roemer (1998), Kolm (1996), and Fleurbaey (1995). A 
common feature of these theories is that they draw a distinction between responsibility 
factors and non-responsibility factors. Inequalities arising from non-responsibility factors 
are considered to be unjust, while inequalities arising from responsibility factors are seen 
as just. The principle of fair income distribution in equation (3) is also consistent with 
views expressed by a large majority of respondents in the Norwegian ”Hidden Labour 
Market Survey” from 2003 (Barth et al. 2008). The survey was designed by the Frisch 
centre for economic research, and undertaken as a representative postal survey by the 
Markeds og Mediainstituttet A/S. The response rate was 58 percent and 1062 individuals 
where interviewed. In this survey 87 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement 
“Income differences that are a result of factors under individual control, such as choice of education, 
profession or work time, should be accepted” and 88 percent of the respondents agreed to the 
statement “People deserve equal income for equal labor effort”.  
Based on these results, we make the simplifying assumption that people view 
inequalities due to hours worked as fair, while inequalities due to differences in the wage 
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rate are viewed as unfair.5 In a model where the pre-tax income is determined by the wage 
rate and the hours work, this implies that the fair income distribution is to distribute in 
proportion to hours worked.  
In order to get his fair income, an individual i should pay net taxes equal to: 
 
)(** wwlYYT iiiii  .         (4) 
 
Individual i’s actual net tax payment is: 
 
( )i i i i i iT twl B t wl wl    .         (5) 
 
The unfair tax payment, defined as the difference between the actual tax payment iT  and the 
fair tax payment *T , is *
i iT T . We assume that what an individual perceives as a fair tax 
evasion is positively related to the unfair tax payment. To simplify, we assume that the fair 
evasion equals the unfair tax payment, i.e. 
* *e T T  . Using (4) and (5), the fair evasion 
can then be written as: 
 
* * (1 )i i i ie T T w t w l B                (6) 
It follows from Equation (6) that the fair tax evasion may be positive (when actual tax 
payment is higher than the fair tax payment) or negative (when actual tax payment is lower 
than the fair tax payment) and that it is strictly decreasing in the hourly wage rate w. More 
hours worked increases the justifiable evasion if and only if the fair wage rate w  exceeds 
the net hourly wage (1 )t w . If the fair wage rate is lower than the net hourly wage, the 
fair evasion is negative and decreasing in the number of work hours. However, the crucial 
result for our purpose is that the fair evasion is strictly increasing in the number of hours 
worked for a given total income wl . Hence, it is useful to write the fair evasion as a 
function of l and wl, i.e. *( , )e l wl where 
*
1( , ) 0e l wl  and 
*
2( , ) 0e l wl  . 
The intuition behind this result is important: Any linear tax system that sets the 
rate between zero and unity has two opposing effects on unfairness. First, it reduces the 
inequalities between individuals who work the same number of hours, but have different 
hourly wages. Second, it reduces the inequalities between individuals who have the same 
hourly wage, but work different number of hours. If wage rates are seen as outside 
individual control, while hours worked are seen as inside individual control, it might be 
                                                 
5 How reasonable this assumption is depends on the extent to which hours worked can be freely chosen and 
the extent to which the wage rate is outside individual control.  
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argued that the first effect contributes to reduced unfairness, whereas the second effect 
contributes to increased unfairness.  
 
2.2. Fairness and the willingness to evade taxes 
With the fair tax evasion *e specified by (6), the difference between actual and the fair 
evasion can now be written as *( , ) ( , , )ut e l wl d u l wl  . Since *1( , ) 0e l wl  and
*
2( , ) 0e l wl  , it follows that 1( , , ) 0d u l wl t  , 2( , , ) 0d u l wl  and 3( , , ) 0d u l wl  .  The 
absolute value of d, 
*( , )ut e l wl , can be called the deviation from fairness. Hence, for a 
given total income wl and evasion u, the deviation from fairness decreases in the number 
of work hours if *( , )ut e l wl and increases in the number of work hours if *( , )ut e l wl . 
Consequently, the cost of deviating from fairness, f(d), increases with the number of work 
hours if *( , )ut e l wl and decreases with the number of work hours if *( , )ut e l wl . 
 Maximizing V with respect to l and u yields the two first order conditions 
 
( , ) '( )ut u wl f d t            (7) 
 
 2 3(1 ) '( ) '( ) ( , , ) ( , , )t w zc l f d d u l wl d u l wl w         (8) 
 
Equation (7) says that the marginal gain from one dollar evaded, the saved tax payment t, 
should equal the marginal expected penalty u plus the cost or gain from the change in 
fairness,                 . Whether the fairness effect is positive or negative depends 
on whether the actual evasion ( ut ) is above or below the fair evasion ( *e ). The left hand 
side of Equation (8) is the net gain from working one more hour. The right hand side is 
the marginal effort cost of one more work hour plus the changed cost of deviating from 
fairness. As for a change in evasion, the sign of the fairness effect depends on whether the 
actual evasion is above or below the fair evasion. If an individual evades less than the 
justifiable amount
*e , then 0d  and so '( ) 0f d  . This implies that the fairness effect 
reduces the marginal cost of evasion, since more evasion brings evasion closer to its 
justifiable amount. The fairness effect increases the marginal cost of work effort. The 
reason is that higher work effort increases the justifiable evasion, for a given income wl.   
How do fairness considerations affect peoples’ willingness to evade taxes? In order 
to study this question we compare individuals who have the same total income wl, but 
who may differ with respect to both their wage rates and their relative preferences for 
consumption over leisure. To simplify, we may think of two groups, A and B, where 
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members of group A work fewer hours at a higher wage rate than members of group B, 
i.e A Bw w and A Bl l  such that A A B Bw l w l . The reason why members of group B work 
more hours at a lower wage is that they have a higher relative preference for consumption 
than members of group A, measured by a lower value of  .  
 When β = 0, i.e. when fairness considerations play no role, equation (7) and (8) become 
 
             (7)' 
 
(1 ) '( )t w zc l     (8)΄ 
 
Since total income wl is the same for members of both groups, it follows from (7)΄ that 
they will evade the same amount u. Hence, if we compare individuals who have the same 
total labour income wl, but differ with respect to their wage rates and their relative 
preferences for consumption and leisure, we would expect no differences in their tax 
evasion if fairness considerations play no role.  
If fairness considerations play a role, i.e. if 0  , it follows from (7) and (8) that 
evasion must differ between the two groups: Individuals from the high-wage group A will 
evade less than individuals from the low-wage group B. To see this, let us show that the 
opposite cannot be true, i.e. we cannot have A Bu u . Since 
*
1( , ) 0e l wl  , A A B Bw l w l  
and A Bl l  , implies that the fair tax evasion is lower for A than for B, i.e. 
* *
A Be e . Since
*( , )d ut e l wl  , this implies that A Bd d  if A Bu u . If A Bu u and A Bd d  the right 
hand side of equation (7), the marginal cost of evasion, would be higher for A than for B. 
Hence, A Bu u  cannot be true when the first order condition (7) holds for both groups. 
Since members of the B-group have lower wages and a higher relative preference for 
consumption than members of the A-group, they are treated more unfairly by the tax 
system. As a consequence, they are willing to evade more taxes, i.e. A Bu u .  
To sum up, if there is a fairness effect ( 0)  , we would expect people who are 
unfairly treated by the tax system, i.e. those who work long hours for a low wage, to be 
more willing to evade than those who work less for a lower wage. As shown above we 
expect no such difference in the willingness to evade if there is no fairness effect ( 0) 
between people who have the same income. Our model predicts that people’s willingness 
to evade taxes does not only depend on their total income, but also on whether this 
income is earned as a result of many work hours or a high wage rate. For the same total 
income, an individual who has earned his income as a result of many work hours at a low 
wage is willing to evade more than an individual who earns the same total income with a 
higher wage rate and fewer work hours.  
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Our prediction of how fairness consideration affects the willingness to evade taxes 
differs from that of other models. While many other types of fairness arguments implies 
that an individual’s income affects his moral cost of evasion, our model is the first to 
suggest that it matters whether his income is a result of long work hours or a high wage 
rate. For example, the fairness argument of Bordignon (1993) implies that the income of 
an individual matters for his moral cost of evasion since it determines whether or not he 
pays too much taxes compared to his gain from the public expenses. Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) discuss moral costs that depend directly on the amount evaded, such as 
bad conscience or social stigma. Also in this case, we would not expect the willingness to 
evade to be affected by whether the income is earned as a result of long hours or high 
wage rates.   
 
3. Empirical analysis 
According to our theoretical model, the propensity to justify tax evasion is increasing in the 
number of hours worked, conditional on monthly income. Furthermore, as a result of 
fairness considerations, an individual’s optimal level of tax evasion, conditional on monthly 
pay, is also increasing in hours worked. We use Norwegian survey data to investigate if 
these patterns show up in the data as well. It should, however, be stressed that the 
theoretical predictions were based on the assumption that the tax system was purely 
redistributive, while the Norwegian tax system also finances public goods.    
The data is taken from the Survey on the Hidden Labour Market (SHLM). For our 
analysis we use observations of all 532 individuals in the survey who were of the age 18-64 
and wage earners, working at least 20 hours in regular employment the week before the 
survey and had valid answers to the questions we use. The first question we ask is: Can tax 
evasion be justified? The alternatives were yes, no and do not know. Of the valid answers to 
this question in the full survey, 162 (16%) answered yes, 720 (69%) answered no, while 
the remaining 160 (15%) answered do not know. In our sample of 532 individuals, the 
answers where distributed as follows: 
 
Table 1. Distribution of answers to the justification question. Wage earners.  
Yes   96  (18%) 
No  364 (68%) 
Don’t know  72  (13%) 
N  532 
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In the questionnaire the individuals were also asked about their willingness to take 
unreported income and if they had actually performed unreported work the previous 12 months. 
Two dummy variables, “Willing” and “Actual”, are given the value 1 if the respondent 
answered yes to the respective questions. As we show table A1 in the appendix, 41 
percent reported that they were willing to take home unreported income, while 11 percent 
reported having actually done unreported work during the last 12 months.   
The survey contains information on the human capital variables gender, age, and 
educational level. Respondents are also asked about their perceived probability of being 
detected if they receive unreported income and to what extent they believe that others 
accept tax evasion. We also have information about their pay in their regular job. Several 
of the variables are reported in brackets (see table A1), for instance hourly pay. These 
variables are transformed into continuous variables using the midpoints of each bracket. 
Working hours is defined as hours in their regular job and reported in categories only. In 
our sample, the intervals are 20-29, 30-39, 40-49 and 50 hours and more. A continuous 
variable is constructed, taking the values 25, 35, 45 and 55 accordingly. Monthly earnings 
are constructed as the product of hourly pay and reported working hours, both measured 
in terms of their regular job. Summary statistics of the key variables in the sample are 
given in table A1.   
 
3.1. Working hours and taxation 
Table 2 reports the key indicators of justification and tax evasion for different intervals of 
working hours. Regular weekly working hours in Norway are 37.5 hours per week. As 
predicted by our model, we find an increasing tendency to justify tax evasion as the 
number of hours worked increases. There is also an increasing tendency to be willing to 
take home income without reporting it to the authorities, as well as an increasing tendency 
to have actually performed unreported work during the last 12 months as the number of 
working hours increase. In particular, there appears to be a jump for all three outcomes 
among those who work more than the regular weekly working hours.   
 
Table 2. Tax evasion and working hours  
Working 
hours 
Numbers of 
observations 
Justification 
Can tax 
evasion be 
justified? 
Willing 
If you had the 
possibility to take home 
income without 
reporting it to the tax 
authorities, would you 
be willing to do so? 
Actual 
Have you performed 
work during the last 12 
months that were not (is 
not going to be) reported 
to the tax authorities? 
20-29 44 11.4 31.8 6.8 
30-39 364 15.1 38.2 9.9 
40-49 99 31.3 52.5 17.1 
50+ 25 20.0 44.0 12.0 
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Note: Percentage in each working hours category who report that they believe tax evasion 
can be justified, that they are willing to evade taxes and that they actually have evaded 
taxes the last 12 months.  
Clearly, this pattern may be due to a host of factors other than fairness 
considerations. To control for these factors, we undertake a series of simple (probit) 
regression analyses.  
In table 3 we report the results of five simple probit models. In the first three 
models, the dependent variable is the dummy for agreeing that tax evasion can be justified. 
The main prediction from our theoretical model is that for a given income, an individual 
who work more hours to earn this income should be more likely to justify tax evasion. 
Accordingly, we include as our main explanatory variable the log of weekly hours worked. 
In model 1 we control for individual characteristics: gender, age, and education. It turns 
out that women are less likely than men to justify tax evasion and that the probability of 
justifying tax evasion is declining with age. There is also a positive but not significant 
relationship between hours worked and the probability of justifying tax evasion.  
 In model 2 we include control for monthly earnings and (perceived) marginal tax. 
Thus we may compare individuals who work different hours but make the same amount 
of money. The relationship between working hours and justification is strongly positive 
and doubled from the first specification. This observation is consistent with the first 
prediction of our theoretical model. The coefficient is significant at a 1 percent level, but 
equally important, the effect is also economically very significant: Increasing working 
hours by 10 percent increases the probability of justifying tax evasion by 2.5 percentage 
points, for instance from the average level of 18 percent to 20.5 percent. In line with the 
predictions from our model, we also find that the probability of justifying tax evasion is 
negatively associated with monthly pay, conditional on working hours (i.e. changes in the 
wage rate).  
One potential problem with this result is that there may be a relationship between 
reported earnings to the tax authorities, and the probability of being audited by the same 
authorities. People who intend to evade taxes might therefore work more hours in order 
to reduce the probability of an audit. This relationship may create a spurious correlation 
between working hours in regular employment and the probability of justifying tax 
evasion. We therefore add the individual’s perceived probability of being caught by the tax 
authorities, as well as the individual’s perception of other’s acceptance of tax evasion in 
model 3. We note that these variables have large coefficients and considerable explanatory 
power on our dependent variable, but that the association between working hours and 
justification is more or less unaffected by the inclusion of these variables.  
In model 4 we report from a probit analysis of the probability of replying ‘yes’ to 
the “willing” question (see the heading of table 2 for the full wording of the question). We 
find that willingness to evade taxes follows a similar pattern as justification of tax evasion, 
even though significance levels vary. Willingness declines with age and is lower for women 
than for men. The perceived probability of being caught and the beliefs about others’ 
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acceptance of tax evasion are significantly correlated with the willingness to evade taxes. 
Conditional on monthly pay, an increase in working hours by 10 percent is associated with 
a 2.7 percent higher probability of being willing to take home unreported income, 
however, this correlation is not statistically significant. 
 
Table 3. Working hours and tax evasion: Probit equations 
                      Justify 1     Justify 2    Justify 3       Willing        Actual    
                           b/se          b/se          b/se          b/se          b/se    
ln(working hours)         .1274         .2489**       .2489**       .2756         .1292    
                        (.0955)       (.1222)       (.1132)       (.1771)       (.0873)    
Woman (d)                -.1215***     -.1294***     -.0703**      -.1089**      -.0698**  
                        (.0334)       (.0340)       (.0333)       (.0509)       (.0273)    
Age                      -.0069***     -.0063***     -.0038**      -.0019        -.0006    
                        (.0016)       (.0017)       (.0016)       (.0025)       (.0013)    
Secondary education (d)      .0215         .0301         .0487        -.0294         .0365    
                        (.0521)       (.0532)       (.0518)       (.0682)       (.0388)    
Tertiary education (d)      .0300         .0607         .0863*       -.0892        -.0095    
                        (.0483)       (.0527)       (.0505)       (.0709)       (.0372)    
ln(monthly pay)                        -.0957*       -.0859        -.0643        -.0579    
                                      (.0582)       (.0544)       (.0813)       (.0443)    
Marginal tax                            .1512         .1231        -.2302        -.1273    
                                      (.1829)       (.1706)       (.2655)       (.1443)    
Generally accepted (d)                                  .1025***      .2858***      .0393    
                                                    (.0313)       (.0433)       (.0259)    
Prob(revealed)                                       -.3757***     -.6225***     -.1867*** 
                                                    (.0779)       (.1121)       (.0626)    
                                                                        
                                                                                           
N                    532 532 532 532 532 
 
Note: Marginal effects evaluated at mean values of the r.h.s. variables. . (d) dummy variable. Marginal effects 
are calculated as the effect of a change from 0 to 1. Levels of significance (*** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.10).  
 
In model 5 we report results from a probit model of the question:  Have you performed work 
during the last 12 months that is not (is not going to be) reported to the tax authorities? 
We find a positive correlation between working hours and the probability of 
actually having performed unreported work. The relationship is, however, not as strong as 
the relationship between working hours and justification or willingness, and not 
statistically significant. 
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Table 4. Norms and tax evasion: multivariate probit equations 
                       Justify         Willing       Actual      Justify           Willing      Actual   
                           b/se          b/se          b/se          b/se          b/se          b/se    
ln(Working hours)        1.0423**       .6697         .7942        1.1786**       .4341         .5585    
                        (.5297)       (.4470)       (.5716)       (.5383)       (.4667)       (.6021)    
Woman                   --.3238**     --.2633**     --.4700**     --.3345**     --.1816       --.3920**  
                        (.1619)       (.1306)       (.1872)       (.1615)       (.1377)       (.1993)    
Age                     --.0185**     --.0064       --.0058       --.0180**     --.0017       --.0013    
                        (.0075)       (.0063)       (.0083)       (.0076)       (.0067)       (.0089)    
Secondary education       .2226       --.0923         .1237         .2186       --.1214         .1141    
                        (.2244)       (.1767)       (.2266)       (.2258)       (.1791)       (.2318)    
Tertiary education        .3860*      --.2588       --.1516         .4004*      --.3507*      --.2509    
                        (.2318)       (.1836)       (.2403)       (.2334)       (.1875)       (.2494)    
ln(monthly pay)         --.3436       --.0417       --.2701       --.4070         .0179       --.1935    
                        (.2515)       (.2057)       (.2817)       (.2578)       (.2070)       (.2932)    
Marginal tax              .4778       --.7181       --.7898         .5798       --.9439       --.9994    
                        (.7909)       (.6656)       (.9721)       (.8032)       (.6795)      (1.0242)    
Prob(revealed)         --1.7292***   --1.5565***   --1.2563***   --1.7706***   --1.2872***    --.9717**  
                        (.3841)       (.2849)       (.4355)       (.3854)       (.3176)       (.4855)    
Generally accepted        .4709***      .7996***      .2490         .4970***      .7027***      .1230    
                        (.1540)       (.1199)       (.1749)       (.1552)       (.1340)       (.1908)    
Justify 
   
                   .9949***      .8423*   
    
                 (.3714)       (.4592)    
Constant                --.9819      --1.3266       --.7328       --.9919      --1.3095       --.8693    
                       (1.7581)      (1.4761)      (2.0444)      (1.7826)      (1.4986)      (2.1149)    
Cov JA      .3959*** 
  
   --.0561    
  
 
   (.1017)    
  
   (.2469)    
  Cov AW 
 
     .8286*** 
  
     .8255*** 
 
  
   (.1281)    
  
   (.1544)    
 Cov JW 
  
     .4796*** 
  
   --.0063    
   
   (.0911)    
  
   (.1913)    
N 532 532 532 532 532 532 
 
Note: Probit coefficents. Levels of significance (*** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.10). 
 
One potential problem with our finding is that justification, willingness and actual 
performance may be correlated, and that the effect of working time on the propensity to 
justify tax evasion may be affected by this correlation. We address this problem first by 
running a multivariate probit model that allows for arbitrary correlation between the three 
outcomes. The results are reported in table 4. We do indeed find a strong and significantly 
positive correlation between the three outcomes, even when conditioning on these 
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variables. We also find that the probability of justifying tax evasion is increasing in 
working hours, conditional on monthly earnings, even when we allow for a correlation 
between justification and the willingness and actual performance of tax evasion. Again, the 
effect of working hours is statistically significant for justification only.    
In the second part of table 4, we impose more structure on the model and 
investigate the role of justification on the probability of being willing to evade income and 
actually perform tax evasion directly, under the assumption that the direction of causality 
goes from norms to behaviour, but still allowing the error terms to be correlated across 
outcomes. 
We find that under these assumptions, justification has a strong impact on both 
willingness to evade taxes and actual tax evasion. We also observe that the coefficient of 
working time on both willingness to evade taxes and actual tax evasion drops once we 
introduce justification into the equation, suggesting that the impact of working time 
mostly go through justification. Again, working hours have a statistically significant 
relationship with justification only. Of course, lack of convincing instruments for each of 
the outcomes necessitates caution with respect to the interpretation of this result, since 
feed-back effects from behaviour to justification are indeed possible. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we have addressed the questions of how fairness considerations affect tax 
evasion. In section 2 we developed a theoretical model in which we assumed that 
individuals were motivated by a desire for income and leisure and by a desire to act in 
accordance with what they consider to be fair. We furthermore assumed that they view it 
as fair that income is distributed in proportion to hours worked. Based on this model we 
predicted that for individuals with a given total income the propensity to justify tax 
evasion should be increasing in the number of hours worked. The empirical analysis 
conforms with this prediction, since individuals with low wages and long working hours 
are more likely to justify tax evasion. We have also found a strong positive relationship 
between the probability of justifying tax evasion and actual performance of unreported 
work.   
These results are consistent with a model in which individuals make a trade-off 
between economic gains and fairness considerations when they make decisions about tax 
evasion. Taken together our results suggest that considerations of fair income distribution 
are important for the analysis of tax evasion. 
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